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ABSTRACT 
This article presents a comparative critique of the ‘processual temporalities’ which infuse 
both social scientific theorising, and selected Western cultural practices. Through study of a 
public-private partnership which emerged from a biotechnology project devised for 
producing ‘self-cloning’ maize for resource-poor farmers, I analyse how processual 
temporalities were central to re-gearing knowledge practices towards market-oriented 
solutions. In a study of characterisations of the ‘state of flux’ which affects life in a French 
peri-urban village, I explore how processualism is identified as a component of a 
metropolitan hegemony which villagers ‘resist’ through idealising ‘enduring temporalities’ of 
cultural practice. Drawing on Arendt and Deleuze, I analyse processualism as a dominant 
contemporary chronotope, mediating and disciplining conflictive temporalities and practices, 
underwriting economic projects of deterritorialisation and restructuring—whose idiom is 
also prominent in social scientific paradigms. I substitute an ‘immanent anthropology’, which 
advocates a non-transcendental ontology of cultural practice and analysis—displacing 
anthropological analysis onto a polychronic temporal foundation. 
 
process (n.): fact of going on or being carried on XIV; proceedings at law; 
outgrowth XVI; continuous operation XVII. (O)F. procès L. prōcessus, f.pp. 
stem of prōcēdere proceed.1 
—Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 
  
In the place of the concept of Being we now find the concept of Process. 
—Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
 
It is increasingly apparent that since the 1980s, ‘process’ has emerged as a 
central and governing trope in the Western social scientific imaginary.2 While 
theoretical arguments for why this should be so have been widely voiced (e.g. 
Giddens 1979, Smith 1982, Wolf 1982), the social context for this intellectual 
transformation is less transparent, nor has the conceptual meaning of this 
influential trope been extensively debated (Hodges 2008:400–403, Lyman 2007). 
Following Michael Herzfeld’s observation that one of the potential contributions 
of an anthropology of Western societies is its ability to analyse ‘where “our” 
[anthropological] ideas come from’ (Asad et al. 1997:713), in this article I explore 
correspondences between social scientific invocations of ‘process’ and 
‘processual temporalities’ prevalent in selected Western cultural practices. The 
emergence of ‘process’ as a dominant analytical trope is also linked to an 
epochal revolution in the temporality of anthropological analysis, involving a 
shift from static, a-temporal analytical frames to approaches grounded in the 
ontological assumption that social life exists in ‘time’, ‘flow’, or ‘flux’.3 This 
enquiry therefore takes the form of a comparative ethnographic study informed 
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by the anthropology of time. In the context of this special issue, I explore how 
processual temporalities in their multiple forms are both ethnographically 
emblematic of ‘modern time’, and also operate as a core trope of contemporary 
social science, and analyse this correspondence.  
 
The impetus for this enquiry comes from research on how ‘processualism’ is 
manifested in Western European and scientific cultural practices. This primarily 
concerns ethnographic contexts in which processual temporalities are 
conspicuous and discursively enabling (Hodges 2010, 2012), and where they may 
be entangled with what can be termed processual or disciplinary ‘regimes of 
truth’ (Foucault 1980). A parallel focus, however, targets the temporal idioms of 
anthropological discourse, in which the concept of process, in the contemporary 
era, has acted as a core concept (Hodges 2008). Twenty years ago, Nancy Munn 
(1992:93) argued that ‘when time is a focus [for anthropologists], it may be 
subject to oversimplified, single-stranded descriptions or typifications, rather 
than to a theoretical examination of basic sociocultural processes through which 
temporality is constructed’. Arguably, the dominant notion of timespace that 
underwrites contemporary anthropology is couched in the processual idiom, 
which Munn invokes. While this idiom is not necessarily oversimplified, it 
operates, in Osborne’s (1995:28) definition, ‘insofar as all such totalizations 
abstract from the concrete multiplicity of differential times co-existing in the 
global “now” a single differential … through which to mark the time of the 
present’. In this sense, it anchors anthropological analysis in a potentially 




‘Process’, it can be proposed, has become such an integral cog in the doxa of 
social science that it is easy to forget that it is a socio-historical concept, a 
cultural figure with which to frame action and conjure ‘time’ (Arendt 1958:230–
36). In its common, shorthand analytical form, it is used by anthropologists to 
construct the transcendent temporal unity of cultural practices, bounded or 
open-ended ‘processes’ often incorporating change but which exhibit a coherent, 
systematic set of linkages ‘over time’, which are documented ethnographically 
and require elucidation.4 Simultaneously, it can invoke a diachronic, spatialised 
temporal foundation for study that, in the words of White (1959:16–17), views 
cultural practice as ‘a stream flowing down through time [comprising a] process’. 
These words underwrite White’s evolutionary approach, but they inhabit the 
same conceptual neighbourhood as influential contemporary formulations. One 
of White’s students provides a familiar image, with the notion that ‘the world of 
humankind constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes’ (Wolf 
1982:3)—itself echoed in a range of canonical texts with distinct genealogies and 
analytical foci that nevertheless concur on the processual character of social life 
and its rootedness in the ‘flow of time’ (e.g. Bourdieu 1977, Fabian 1983, 
Giddens 1979). Yet, notably, such works rarely define or clarify this constitutive 
processual ontology.5 
 
Such uses of the concept are not necessarily teleological and can acknowledge 
emergence. And processes are sometimes said to co-exist and operate at 
different tempos, as the Annales historians notably argued (e.g. Braudel 1994). 
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But it is uncontroversial to assert that these assumptions underwrite an 
increasing majority of ethnographic and analytical practices. ‘Process’ is used to 
construct a relation in which past-present-future are conjoined in a structured 
epochal moment, usually for the purposes of achieving a future goal—as in 
Wolf’s (1982) concept of ‘historical processes’; or Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of the 
gift as a temporal process of deferred reciprocity; or, in a precedent, Turner’s 
(1969) concept of the ‘ritual process’. It is also used, often simultaneously, to 
invoke the soul of ‘time’, a spatialised, riverine ‘flow’ or ‘flux’ in and through 
which processes unfold—that cousin to ‘linear’ or ‘homogeneous empty time’ 
(see Bourdieu 1977:8, Giddens 1979:55 cf. Agamben 1993:90–105, Hodges 
2008:399–400). Processual transit towards future goals can thereby be 
conceived in terms of spatial direction. In this regard, ‘process’ is to the 
temporality of anthropological analysis what ‘place’ was to anthropological 
studies of community (Gupta & Ferguson 1997): it operates as a foundational 
core concept, furnishing a constructed epochal moment or temporal ‘clearing’ 
that serves (largely unquestioned) as a frame for study. 
  
This correspondence between manifestations of processual temporalities in 
Western cultural practices, and the centrality of the processual idiom within the 
social sciences, invites closer examination. Could it be a case of anthropology’s 
doxic Euro-American cultural foundations emerging in theoretical paradigms 
(Asad et al. 1997)? According to Arendt, one genealogy of processual time has 
played an influential role in the development of industrial societies, in a 
multiplicity of ways. Most significantly, this processualism concerns the 
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subjection of raw materials and people to procedures of production. Such 
procedures instrumentalise social relations and ‘things’ into means which are 
subsumed into end-products and their correlates in profit (Arendt 1958, cf. 
Thompson 1967). In this sense, it is a key template for modern social 
organisation—yet this materialist manifestation is paralleled in the increasing 
visibility of processual idioms in Western scientific, political and historical 
discourses from the 18th Century onwards (Arendt 1968). Arendt opposes this 
instrumental processualism with the disruptive character of human action, 
capable of initiating new processes, of which the emblematic symbol is birth 
(‘natality’), suggesting that the value of processualism is ambivalent—a point to 
which I return (Arendt 1958:305–309, Passerin d’Entrèves 1994:53–58).  
 
Another key processual idiom in Western discourse can arguably be traced to the 
pre-Socratics, notably Heraclitus (cf. Barnes 1987), and comprises that 
temporalized philosophical discourse which in its 20th century incarnation has 
been highly influential in shaping the social sciences, chiefly through 
phenomenological philosophy (Heidegger 1993, Merleau-Ponty 1962, Schutz 
1967).6 In this respect, social life and time itself are viewed as inherently 
processual and the moment is subordinated to temporal flow, in the context of 
which it achieves its intelligibility. The prominence of this tradition since the early 
20th Century should be viewed alongside the emergence of other processual 
idioms that Arendt identifies.  
 
The heterogeneity of such idioms and cultural templates therefore suggests that 
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processualism is a polythetic category of cultural practices, with both academic 
and wider variants. Nevertheless, for Arendt (1958:232–33, 1968:62), these 
varieties of processualism are complexly related, as they appear to be in 
anthropological discourse—although it is unclear to what extent anthropological 
reliance on such idioms is related to wider socio-economic developments in 
Western societies, as this correspondence has gone largely unremarked in the 
literature. Jameson (1998:169–70) offers a more assertive outlook, suggesting 
that the hegemony of processualism:  
 
… may be open to all kinds of other doubts and suspicions, particularly in a 
society whose current economic rhythms perpetuate and thrive on 
permanent change: capital accumulation, investment and realisation, the 
dissolution of stable firms and jobs into a flux of new and provisional 
entities, awash in structural unemployment, its cultural infrastructure 
committed to permanent revolution in fashion and to the imperative to 
generate new kinds of commodities, [or] in deeper crises … wholly new 
production technologies.  
 
Just as post-modernism is arguably the ‘cultural logic’ of late capitalism (and 
structural-functionalism that of the colonial era), one can infer that for Jameson, 
the hegemony of processualism is symptomatic of contemporary historical 
circumstances, and in particular, neo-liberal political economic practices (cf. 
Jameson 1991, Blackwell and Seabrook 1993). This view is echoed in Koselleck’s 
(1985) analysis of the temporality of ‘modernity’, which is marked, he argues, by 
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the ideology that history and time are an incessant movement or process to 
which every historical object and actor is subordinated, and by a hegemonic 
processualism operating at the level of social organisation. In Koselleck’s 
conceptualization, the increasing disjunction between contemporary ‘horizons of 
expectation’ and ‘spaces of experience’ ultimately enforces this triumph of the 
processual (ibid.:255–75). 
 
Such correspondences are intriguing, if counter-intuitive, and suggest that some 
processual approaches may be marked by temporal obfuscation, and even 
ethnocentrism. It is also clear that the monological character of processual 
idioms can obscure those ‘conflicts’ in timespace that would become apparent 
with use of a differential, non-spatialised temporal idiom (e.g. Adam 1998, 
Gurvitch 1964). How can this correspondence between social scientific and 
Western temporalities be posed as an anthropological problem? The route 
adopted here is to undertake a comparative, exploratory ‘anthropology of 
process’—in contrast to a ‘processual anthropology’. This approach presents an 
ethnographic perspective on contemporary, processual, at times disciplinary 
regimes of truth, and includes anthropology within its scope. I proceed with two 
comparative ethnographic cases—of a multinational public-private partnership in 
agricultural biotechnology research based chiefly in Marseille, France; and of 
local conceptualisations of history and process among the conflictive population 
of a rural commune, in coastal Languedoc. Rather than taking ‘processes’ as an 
object and temporal frame for study, I focus on their temporal and epochal 
construction, discursive agency, and analytical manifestation. Discussion then 
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moves to consider anthropological temporalities. Drawing on an analytical frame 
that can be characterised as temporally ‘immanent’ rather than ‘processual’ in 
orientation (Agamben 2000, Deleuze 2001), and focused on how processes are 
‘achieved’ rather than taking their ‘transcendental coherence’ as given (cf. 
Whitehead 1979:208–18), I query the hegemony of this modern temporal figure, 
and explore the implications.7 
 
 
PROCESSUAL REGIMES—THE MOLECULARISATION OF PLANTS 
The operationalisation of biological time is a dominant characteristic of the 
interactions of humans and cells in technical environments over the last 
fifty years. In short, living matter is now assumed to be stuff that can be 
stopped and started at will. 
—Hannah Landecker, Culturing Life: How Cells Became Technologies 
 
On the outskirts of Marseille, among the umbrella pines and dusty industrial 
parks, stands the futuristic oval building—la caprice des Dieux, to its staff—
housing the headquarters of Agromonde International.8 In the summer of 2009, 
as part of an ESRC-funded investigation into the influence of seed corporations 
over development of agricultural biotechnology for resource-poor farmers, I am 
on one of several visits there to speak with a distinguished French geneticist and 
plant breeder, Dr. Jean Marceau.  
  
For many years Marceau was at CILLOT9, the Mexican agricultural station which 
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helped produce the short-stemmed wheat and rice varieties that drove the 
Green Revolution. He was director of a French-funded ‘Apomixis Project’ to 
transfer ‘apomixis’ into crop plants such as maize and wheat. Apomixis is the 
ability found in some wild plants to self-clone through producing seeds which 
contain copies of maternal DNA. It is said to have a revolutionary potential for 
plant breeding that has been recognised since at least the 1960s, when it was the 
subject of secret Soviet research programs. The introduction of apomixis into a 
commercial crop would have many repercussions. It could enable farmers to 
clone hybrid seed, freeing them from the need to buy it annually from the seed 
industry. It could serve as a breeding tool for the resource-poor, enabling them 
to fix local hybrids for niche microclimates and improve food security. But it 
would also permit seed corporations to significantly increase profits, through 
resulting economies in hybrid seed production. Such claims are contested, yet 
they are taken seriously by major players in the seed industry, which have run 
confidential ‘apomixis projects’ for many years. It is also possible that some 
corporations have actively sought to undermine public sector research that has 
the production of open source apomixis technologies as its goal, in an attempt to 
head off an open source apomixis technology that could undermine profits.  
  
Which returns us to Marseille, where Marceau is explaining how he lost control 
of his project to a team of postdocs and a Syndicate of transnational seed 
corporations. The project, which he spent twenty years developing, aimed to 
produce the world’s first commercial apomictic maize, in an open source form. 
Marceau was a leading expert on apomixis, and the research was at the forefront 
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of the field. Results, he claims, could have been just around the corner. So what 
happened?  
  
One of the things it came down to, he explains, was the new genomics. Marceau 
trained as a plant breeder and classical geneticist. His project was characterised 
by a heteroculture of approaches (cf. Richards 2004), including conventional 
plant breeding, classical genetics, molecular genetics, and genomics 
technoscience, with a flexible research timeline and agenda. In Marceau’s view, 
apomixis is triggered by a gene cluster that intervenes during the plant’s 
reproductive cycle to divert conventional sexual reproduction into a-sexual 
cloning (Marceau 2001). During the late 1990s, however, molecular biologists 
working primarily in laboratories argued that new genomics-based approaches 
showed that apomixis results from a ‘deregulation of the sexual developmental 
program in space and time, leading to putative cell fate changes and the 
omission of critical steps in the sexual process’ (Koltunow & Grossniklaus 
2003:556), triggered in turn by epigenetic processes. This ‘molecular turn’ in 
apomixis research—which is underwritten by an idiom that insists on the 
processual character of apomictic reproduction as opposed to the interventionist 
idiom of Marceau’s classical genetics—was accompanied by wider political 
economic changes of a processual character (cf. Jameson 1998:169–70). As in 
other fields, technoscientific practices were giving rise to genomic approaches to 
plant breeding that were rapidly displacing established practices. At the same 
time, public sector plant breeding institutes were being privatised, and private 
sector influence was extending via new public-private assemblages focused on 
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the production of biocapital. In this regard, the other key mitigating factor was 
the entry of Marceau’s team into a public-private partnership, the ‘Apomixis 
Syndicate’, where there were strict procedural constraints on future research 
trajectories, underwritten by legal contracts. I now review the technical and 
wider shift provoked by this processualist rupture.10 
* 
Let us commence with the CIILOT breeding programme, which was a focus for 
CILLOT research and development (R&D). Interspecific or ‘wide’ hybridisation, 
also termed ‘wide crossing’, involves cross-fertilising two plants of distinct, but 
related genera. The objective is ‘introgression’ of a target trait from one genus to 
the other, which in this case, concerned transferring apomixis from Tripsacum 
dactyloides (Gamagrass) to Zea mays (Maize). The technique involves 
undertaking multiple experimental crosses with the goal of creating a hybrid 
containing the target trait. The practice is also enabled by plant breeding 
technologies. Once a suitable hybrid plant is identified—in this case with 
apomictic capability—this is ‘backcrossed’ with a plant from the target genus to 
excise unwanted hybrid features, which usually takes at least four generations. 
Interspecific hybridisation is based on a ‘natural’ evolutionary model—wide 
hybridisation events have been central to the development of a number of key 
human crops in the past.11  
  
From a temporal perspective, wide crossing is a breeding practice where 
temporal emergence is ‘thematised’ methodologically (cf. Pickering 1995:9–27): 
in this sense, ‘unruly’ mixing of distinct genomes during ‘meiosis’ underpins the 
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technique, generating novelty. The temporality of research and development 
therefore demands an open-ended, flexible funding arrangement and timeline. 
An apomictic maize created via wide crossing would thus constitute a new 
species, which could not be easily ‘switched’ on and off via a ‘Genetic Use 
Restriction Technology’, for example. It would be resistant to intellectual 
property rights, although some control over production and distribution could be 
exerted via patenting and plant breeders’ rights.12 As the time needed to achieve 
success is an unknown variable, the practice may also clash with the calendar for 
deliverables enshrined in a PPP contract. 
  
The breeding technique can thus be said to comprise a relational, self-conscious 
‘dance of agency’ (Pickering 1995:21–22) between technology, human actors, 
and the creative agency of plant species, with the objective of producing hybrid 
apomictic maize. Its ethos is one of ‘revealing’ (aletheia) rather than ‘enframing’ 
(Gestell) (Heidegger 1993). Enframing is symptomatic of an instrumentality 
associated with procedures of commodification central to producing biocapital; 
revealing is, to an extent, temporally subversive of such goals through valorising 
emergence (Feenberg 2005, Pickering 2008). Additionally, the end result would 
be a species of plant whose genomic and reproductive identity was resistant to 
commodification. It would be challenging to control ‘unauthorised’ recycling of 
cloned seeds via existing regulatory means. A resistance to transformation into 
biocapital thus remains at the level of both the relation of the final product to 
IPR, and in terms of research and development practices. Ultimately, this form of 
apomictic maize would exhibit those classic subversive qualities associated with 
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an Apomixis Technology—i.e. a capacity for seed saving, and for crossing with 
commercial hybrids, thus rendering them apomictic and undercutting corporate 
markets.  This breeding practice was embedded in a flexible research programme 
where structured procedures were subordinated to emergent wide hybridisation 
results, under the control of Marceau as PI.  
* 
Molecular genetics was initially utilised within the CILLOT Project in association 
with ‘flow cytometry’, a technology for accelerating screening of wide hybrids for 
apomictic capability. This facilitated a modest level of technical 
instrumentalisation, although it had a minor role. Within the Syndicate, by 
contrast, a selection of genomic technologies were implemented, financed by 
corporate members (e.g. AFLP-PCR, RFLP analysis; see Leblanc et al. 2009:594). 
These could facilitate technical manipulation of the enduring temporality of plant 
reproduction and so render apomixis functional to commodification (Grimanelli 
et al. 2005). As Helmreich (2007:294) proposes: ‘contemporary biological science 
has become expert at stopping, starting, suspending and accelerating cellular 
processes, wedging these dynamics into processes that look like a molecular 
version of industrial agribusiness’. The objective, arguably, is subordination to 
disciplinary procedures (Foucault 1977). Scientific arguments were made within 
the PPP for the greater efficiency and instrumentality of such technical practices, 
which lent weight to the argument that the project would stand a greater chance 
of succeeding if the objective was creation of a GM apomict (Grimanelli et al. 
2001). Corporate partners thought that GM techniques would also enable IPR 




The project’s ‘molecular turn’ is comparable to what Rose (2007) has termed 
‘molecularisation’. As Rose writes: ‘molecularisation strips tissues, proteins, 
molecules … of their specific affinities—to a disease, to an organ, to an 
individual—and enables them to be regarded, in many respects, as manipulable, 
and transferable elements or units, which can be delocalised’ (2007:36). This 
disciplinary programme also has an inherently temporal quality. Landecker 
(2005:2, emphasis retained) comments: 
 
These powerful techniques themselves belong to a genre of 
experimentation directed at making cells live differently in time, in order to 
harness their productive or reproductive capacities … [L]ong-standing 
genres of intervention in cellular plasticity and temporality are now moving 
from the background into the foreground of biochemistry and molecular 
biology, disciplines previously focused on knowledge of gene sequences 
and molecules in a more disembodied, atemporal fashion. 
 
As a consequence of molecularisation, plant DNA was instrumentally 
functionalised (‘enframed’) by Syndicate scientists utilising new biotechnological 
techniques, with contingent processual aims which correlated with the creation 
of biocapital. This ‘techno-cellular’ processual temporality of deterritorialisation 
and re-embedding to enable future utility, bears resemblance to that of ‘time in 
advance of itself, where … the future becomes present. This time [is] 
predominant in competitive capitalism’ (Gurvitch 1964:33). ‘Natural processes’ 
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were thereby reassembled into instrumentalised processual constructions. For 
corporate partners, these biotechnologies also promised to create GM products 
which could be patented, hence enabling production of biocapital.  
  
In sum, then, the shift to a processual scientific idiom and practices of 
disciplinary deterritorialisation and re-embedding was accompanied by a 
structural engineering of procedures, timeframes and futures. This was mediated 
by legal contracts. The principal side-shadows of this monoculture were the 
alternative technologies, and alternative futures that wide hybridisation and the 
Marceau heteroculture of idioms and techniques might impel.13 While processual 
idioms and templates were not absent from Marceau’s heteroculture, they did 
not play a disciplining role, given greater flexibility in research practices and a 
related valorising of emergence—which arguably comprised an Arendtian ‘ethic 
of the interval’ (Braun 2007). By contrast, the procedures engineered by 
Syndicate contracts and timescales ensured that processual ideologies of 
genomic understandings of apomixis remained dominant in a timescape 
comprising multiple trajectories, temporal modalities, and tempos. Process, for 
the Syndicate, acted as a means of disciplining and controlling knowledge 
practices, enabling ‘molecularisation’ whose goal is to render apomixis 
manipulable. It was embedded in turn in a wider configuration of political 
economic relations—that of the corporate stranglehold on the global seed 
industry. It is an illustration of how processual knowledge and organisational 
practices operate together, as Arendt (1958: 232–33, 1968:62) proposes. In this 
way, ‘process’ was discursively employed to weld a conflictive field of force and 
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emergence into a disciplined transit through time towards a specific goal—a 
commodifiable apomixis technology, or nothing. A goal, one should add, that 
remains virtual due to the unruly actions of plants which, to date, have resisted 
such instrumental disciplining.  
 
 
RESISTING PROCESS—LE CHANGEMENT CONTINUEL IN CONTEMPORARY 
LANGUEDOC 
History … no longer speaks of the changeless but, rather, of the laws of 
change which spare nothing. 
—John Berger, And our faces, my heart, brief as photos 
 
During fieldwork in a peri-urban commune in Languedoc, processualism took a 
markedly different form. While there were many processes of an Arendhtian 
nature that structured everyday life in the village of Villeneuve—from the 
production processes associated with commercialised wine growing to those 
procedures which individuals encountered in a wide range of working practices 
in service and light industries in the nearby city of Narbonne—among the most 
conspicuous examples of processualism was its invocation to characterise the 
contemporary epoch. A vivid example was supplied by a fisherman, Raymond 
Cabart. Cabart came from a family of fishermen who had worked the lagoon of 
Villeneuve for many generations. Indeed, his own name first made an 
appearance in the village archives in 1698, when a forebear called Raymond 
Cabart signed as a member of the village council. On first appearances, his life 
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was emblematic of such symbolic continuity and enduring temporalities. Yet in 
conversation, it emerged that for Cabart, life around him was anything but 
enduring. His characterisation of modern times was neatly captured in the 
expression he often repeated, tout a changé—everything in local life had 
changed.  
 
Monsieur Cabart was the first of many informants to speak of an epoch of 
changement continuel—incessant change—which had apparently gripped life in 
Villeneuve since the 1960s. This characterisation cropped up frequently as I 
conducted research on historical consciousness in the locality, and is a more 
open-ended, flexible processual idiom than was encountered in the previous 
case. When I informed new acquaintances that I was keen to learn about life in 
Villeneuve, I was often referred to le changement continuel that now dominated 
everyday life. Indeed, I would normally be told that tout a changé – ‘everything 
has changed’ – which would be followed by selection of empirical contrasts 
between the changeability of life today and the enduring quality of life in the ‘old 
days’ to make the point. This portrait of contemporary history as comprised of 
contrasting historical epochs, adjacent intervals in the ‘flow of time’ (le temps qui 
coule) divided by a major rupture in Villeneuvois life that took place (I was told) 
in the 1960s was not just on show for outsiders such as myself. It was frequently 
conjured as a temporal and historical frame of reference for interpreting 
everyday events, and comprised a moral and temporalising resource which les 
Villeneuvois used to decipher the contingencies of everyday existence and, at 
times, symbolically invoke their collective identity. Contemporary Villeneuve was 
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said to exist in a flux of incessant changes, but this processual epoch was offset 
by an enduring idiom of how life was lived in the past, a collective portrait of a 
time prior to the 1960s when life was stable and unchanging that subverted the 
processual present.14 Let us now explore the context for, and saliency of this 
processual motif. 
* 
Villeneuve is a village of some 600 permanent inhabitants, and lies on a brackish 
lagoon bordering the Mediterranean Sea, some 10 kilometres from the city of 
Narbonne in Southern France. The lagoon supports one of the two economic 
activities for which the village is locally renowned: it is still fished by a handful of 
artisanal fishermen for eels. As for the other, much of Villeneuve’ arid, stony 
earth is planted with vines whose grapes produce the local variety of Corbières 
wine. The population, however, is far from comprising an integrated community 
living off fishing and agriculture. While 55% of permanent residents claim to be 
from the village, the other 45% are recent immigrants, and 30% of the housing 
belongs to second-home owners, of predominantly urban, north European 
origin.15 These social distinctions as perceived by the anthropologist are viewed 
as such by local people as well. Any sense of community is thus fragmented, and 
on-going tensions exist between Villeneuvois and other inhabitants—who many 
Villeneuvois view as ‘colonizing’ the village in a pejorative sense, contributing to 
their marginalization and dispersal as a social group, and driving up house prices 
to an unaffordable degree. Agriculture and fishing are also no longer the 
dominant sources of employment: only 13% of the village live exclusively off 
viticulture and fishing, as opposed to 75% in 1946, and those who grow grapes 
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do so to supplement an income derived from other jobs. More than 60% of the 
active population work in the shops, service industries, and factories of nearby 
Narbonne.16 The village council is also largely comprised of incomers; and the 
‘intangible cultural heritage’ (UNESCO 2003), as we might term it, of indigenous 
Villeneuvois is increasingly appropriated for the heritage tourism projects of 
incomers.  
 
If the preceding description comprises a contemporary snapshot of the village, 
during the 1960s life was significantly otherwise. To begin with, the population, 
367 in 1968, stood at less than half its current number, and over 50% of the 
village’s working adults still laboured within the commune, chiefly in viticulture 
and fishing. Only a third of women worked, as opposed to two-thirds at the turn 
of the 21st Century. Notably, second home owners possessed a fifth of the 
available housing, and there were few incomers. The village still ‘belonged’, then, 
to the Villeneuvois. The chief ritual events of the year also revolved about 
established local industries: the fête de la vendange (‘harvest fête’) in October, 
and the fête des pêcheurs (‘fishermen’s fête’) in July, were the mainstays of the 
year’s festivities. They would disappear or pale in significance by the late 1970s, 
to be replaced by festivals that were increasingly oriented towards tourism by 
the early 21st Century.  
 
Villeneuve was rocked by the unstable political economy of viticultural capitalism 
throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries, and is no stranger to change. But at a 
general level, many cultural features of everyday life in the 1960s also pertained 
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to the ‘deep’ or ‘enduring time’17 of long-term traditional practices—from the 
cooking and eating of  homegrown or locally hunted food, to the widespread 
playing of ritualized practical jokes, to the communal evening veillées. Such 
everyday practices, which comprised core emblems of Villeneuvois belonging, 
had been consolidated in their current forms during the long 19th century of 
viticultural expansion, with the emergence of a Languedocian working class 
rooted in pre-capitalist ‘peasant’ living traditions (Fabre and Lacroix 1973). 
Ultimately, then, this enduring social time, if fractured and rent by the periodic 
convulsions of viticultural capitalism, still retained its potential for symbolization 
as the cusp of an epoch of long-term temporal continuity, in relation to the 
duration of a life being lived. This rendered the lived experience of the 1960s 
qualitatively different from life at the turn of the 21st Century. 
 
The 1970s, however, would bring the consolidation of ruptures in living 
traditions that were already in progress: the decline of viticulture and 
contraction of the agricultural workforce; new work in industries such as the 
Narbonne tile factory or supermarkets; the spread of car ownership and 
‘technologies of comfort’ such as the washing machine; and a shift in the 
authority of living traditions symptomatic of the times. In sum, enduring time 
was being substituted by more erratic forms of social timespace.18 Significantly, 
there was also a broadening of cultural horizons and conceptions of identity, as 
the mass media rendered Villeneuvois more conscious of a world beyond the 
immediately tangible. This encouraged local identification with regional, French 
and European imagined communities (Anderson 1983). It also precipitated a 
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rupture in the local temporal fabric,19 as the past loosened its ties to the cultural 
media of communal oral history, to be invoked more frequently via the mass 
media of televised history, the local papers, the lieu de mémoire, on an expanded 
spatio-temporal scale (cf. Le Goff 1992:90–97, Nora 1997). These historical 
transitions provided the foundation for contemporary conceptions of process 
and stasis, which I now address. 
* 
I have written at length elsewhere about how the manner in which Villeneuvois 
invoke a past of enduring social traditions is not validated by the historical record 
(Hodges 2010). Rather, it is more directly concerned with the positing of group 
belonging in relationship to a shared past. The contrast drawn by Villeneuvois 
between a processual present and a static past was thus partly an historical 
mythologisation, exaggerating those enduring qualities of a communal past and 
the changeability of the present. Villeneuvois had in fact authored a myth of 
origin to satisfy the needs of the present—which had conspicuous precedents. 
Most significantly, this mythologisation portrays the diverse population of the 
pre-1960s, comprised to a significant degree of migrants who had arrived to 
work in viticultural capitalism, as a small community dominated by relatives of 
contemporary indigenous residents. Such a portrait clearly strengthened 
indigenous claims to the locality at a time when their dominance was under 
threat by a new generations of incomers and economic developers.  
 
If mythologisation of the past was therefore a way of addressing present needs, 
when the contemporary epoch was invoked, it was done with greater 
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ambivalence and complexity. Bringing into focus our interest in the processual, 
what is characteristic about the contemporary Villeneuvois epoch is thus its 
metaphorical grounding in changement continuel. In part, it was invoked and 
constituted in binary opposition to the previous epoch, to characterise a fluid 
present or runaway world; in part it made reference to a vague, open-ended and 
unpredictable future of uncertainty and change. And the future itself was not 
usually given a secure character beyond this notional evocation of difference, 
although at times it might become a more empirical, nuanced set of possibilities, 
if queried. There is a clear parallel with radical modernist periodisations, of 
course. A past epoch of enduring time and organic community is set off against a 
contemporary era of disillusion, and erratic time—and imagined in local terms. 
Extending this parallel, the notion that contemporary societies subsist in a 
globalised panorama of continual change is a truism for modern social theory; as 
is the echo in anthropological theory that all human life is fluid, processual and in 
a state of becoming beneath the multiplex cultural practices of global human 
diversity (Hodges 2008:399-403). Putting aside evident differences, it is clear that 
such invocations—rural French, academic, anthropological—are processual at a 
foundational discursive level.  
 
Villeneuvois invocations of changement continuel, then, invoke wider processual 
tropes which are scaled to local contexts of cultural meaning and practice. In 
turn, the time of the interval in Villeneuve, this mythologised, communal past, 
furnishes a resource in the globalized, uncertain, processual timescapes of 
modern France, creating an ‘interval’ in local and wider hegemonic narratives of 
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changement continuel to house enduring values and invoke collectivity. This 
invocation of an enduring idiom and past epoch also embodies the subversive 
alternative of a non-processual temporality; and implies that such a time of 
enduring social traditions might one day emerge. In Villeneuve, then, 
processualism is rhetorically invoked as a shorthand for an encroaching 
modernity and its local agents, and takes its place in a figurative and conceptual 
scheme for local identity politics and resistance to such developments. 
 
In sum, the Villeneuvois processual idiom invoked French language tropes of 
change, flow and flux that conjured that ‘integrated series of connected 
developments’ which Rescher (2000:22) views as characteristic of processualism, 
with an ineliminable temporal dimension. Yet it was focused on an open-ended, 
uncertain future, and change, contingency, and emergence were thus viewed as 
endemic to it. While this appears less structured than the processual biological 
idiom and legally-sanctioned, disciplinary processualism of the Apomixis 
Syndicate, it concords with contemporary anthropological formulations of social 
life as flux-like, processual and in a state of becoming in a foundational sense. It 
is in this sense, then, that processualism can be viewed as a polythetic category 
of cultural practice. Making ‘process’ visible as a temporalising practice, and 
placing it within the frame of social critique, enables ethnographic purchase on 
this complexity. To achieve this, certain temporal assumptions latent in 
anthropological analysis must be set aside. How might the temporal modalities 





TOWARDS AN IMMANENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
 [I]mmanence always remains to be made, that is, conceptualised. This, 
however, does not amount to turning immanence into a concept … [T]he 
plane of immanence is never given as such, or fully intuited; it needs to be 
drawn through the creation of concepts. In a sense, such a task is never-
ending … 
—Miguel de Beistegui, Immanence: Deleuze  and Philosophy 
 
Where should an ‘anthropology of process’ turn for critical precedents, in an 
academic and wider world where the discourse of ‘process’ is dominant? Let us 
begin by extending our commentary on Arendt, before drawing out insights from 
the preceding examples and discussion. Arendt’s critique of processualism is 
interwoven in a complex fashion with her guiding theory of ‘natality’, and is 
recognised as a precursor of Foucault’s work on ‘biopower’ (Agamben 1998). She 
viewed the processual idiom and processual temporalities as operating on 
multiple levels in society—some positive, many negative. Processualism, she 
argues, gained ground with the growing hegemony of scientific outlooks and the 
influence of historiography on Western historical consciousness, but was 
simultaneously embedded in the expansion of capitalist economic organisation, 
in which working activity is subordinated to end products and profit (Arendt 
1958). It took on instrumental roles in the operation of power within the 
totalitarian regimes of the 20th Century (Arendt 1951), and is also a key feature 




Processualism is also central to Arendt’s concept of natality. ‘For Arendt,’ writes 
Passerin d’Entrèves (1994:53), ‘the modern worldview is characterised by its 
emphasis on the idea of process, on the ‘how’ of phenomena, be they natural or 
historical, and by the corresponding loss of the idea of Being.’ The natality 
concept, by contrast, highlights the human capacity to bring novelty into the 
world, thus disrupting the automatism of processes (and temporal continuum) 
and initiating novel acts and processes. The ontological fact of birth underwrites, 
for Arendt, this human freedom, and is invoked each time an individual 
introduces some new action into the world. Natality is central to Arendt’s 
critique of the hegemonic processual temporalities that, in her view, adversely 
underwrote key domains of 20th Century cultural practice. It allowed her to argue 
for the value of the ‘time interval between birth and death’ that could act as an 
existential frame with which to structure the span of a meaningful human life 
(Arendt 1958:97; cf. Braun 2007:19–21). Ultimately, it enabled her to produce a 
philosophical outlook that displaced ‘process’ from its symbolic and conceptual 
throne and conjure a world in which alternative idioms and practices might 
crowd into view, and ‘time’ itself take a differential form. Arendt’s approach is 
thus multi-layered, granting recognition of the value of the process concept and 
the insights it permits—while enabling critique of its cultural hegemony and use 
as a totalising frame.  
  
Arendt provides a critical, socio-historical purchase on processual idioms and 
regimes that can inform ethnographic critique. The process concept is a dynamic 
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temporal bridge between past and future that enables multiplex conceptual 
invention and co-ordinated action, in historically contingent forms (Rescher 
2000). Processual idioms, often grounded in synoptic and organisational models 
of processual time, thereby serve foundational roles in processualist cultural 
practices, and processual regimes of truth in a range of contexts. The social 
scientific processual idiom, in a comparable fashion, identifies ‘time’ as a 
foundational frame, and imagines it as a flow or flux that enables processual 
study—and indeed, the continuities and transformations of real-world processes 
(Smith 1982). In this way, the world is conceptualised as a processual realm, and 
action and event framed and subordinated to selected pasts and futures. To 
what extent, then, might this ‘temporal ontology’ obscure conflictive fields of 
temporal practice, social complexity, and related virtual side-shadows?20 What 
does processual time render invisible, that an immanent, differential temporal 
idiom could induce? And to what extent is its prominence in anthropological 
theory reflective of the hegemony of processualism, in its many forms, in 
contemporary societies, particularly as it pertains to neo-liberal globalisation? 
 
Anthropology, as Bourdieu put it, is ‘fieldwork in philosophy’ (Bourdieu 1990), 
and in this case, philosophical writings on temporal immanence offer a pathway 
to clarifying this anthropological problem. An ‘immanent anthropology’, 
substituted for a processual anthropology, does not imply a wholesale rejection 
of the ‘processual turn’.21 Rather, it demands nuanced recognition of the 
temporally constructed nature of processes—and other genres of continuity, 
rupture and transformation, analytical and ethnographic—and an exploration of 
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the consequences of such insights for anthropology. It finds an origin and 
foundation in a genealogy of thought that adheres to and informs the writings of 
philosophers of immanence such as Spinoza, Deleuze, Foucault, Bergson or 
Nietzsche. The principal insight of such philosophers is an exclusion from 
conceptual schemes of any taken-for-granted assumptions of a transcendence of 
Being. All that exists of timespace resides and differentiates ‘within’ the living 
present, a Spinozan principle of ‘immanent cause’ which produces by remaining 
in itself, that for some is reconceptualised as a ‘plane of immanence’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994). As Agamben (2000:226) writes: ‘Immanence flows forth … 
[y]et this springing forth, far from leaving itself, remains incessantly and 
vertiginously within itself’. In this sense, any event belonging to a ‘process’, 
conceived immanently, is a form of birth, with no transcendent or procedural 
frame (Whitehead 1979).22  
 
Nevertheless, as Agamben points out (2000:227), an aspiration to or invocation 
of transcendence cannot be wholly excluded from philosophical or social 
theories which adhere to the principles of immanence:  
 
…[I]mmanence is not merely threatened by [the] illusion of transcendence, 
in which it is made to leave itself and to give birth to the transcendent. This 
illusion is, rather, something like a necessary illusion in Kant’s sense, which 
immanence produces on its own and to which every philosopher falls prey 




In this regard, the illusion of transcendence is the corollary of any form of 
intelligible discourse, and Husserl (1966) provides one well-known, if problematic 
model for how human consciousness subverts the immanence of being in time 
with his theory of ‘internal time consciousness’. In temporal terms, then, a 
principal tenet of an immanent anthropology must be that discursive aspiration 
to temporal transcendence should be rendered self-aware—and where 
appropriate, subverted. This operation would require a deconstruction of 
assumptions of transcendence inherent in social scientific usages of process, and 
the substitution of a reflexive analytical frame ontologically grounded in 
temporal immanence that can accommodate the multiplicity of timespace.  
 
This philosophical discourse of temporal immanence must now be reframed for 
anthropological practice. Let us draw on our ethnographies of ‘process’ as a 
starting-point. I have illustrated how a major shift in trajectory within frontier 
research in ag-biotech development was enabled by a foregrounding of 
processual idioms in knowledge practices, and processual agreements for public-
private partnerships—a will-to-power that mediates the conflictive timescapes of 
research via legal sanction and a range of disciplinary procedures, thereby 
excluding undesirable side-shadows. I have examined how processual idioms 
operate quite distinctly in rural Languedoc, enabling discursive identification of 
an oppressive contemporary ‘other’ which enables resistance and subversion of 
cultural and economic hegemonies by local people. By utilising an immanent 
temporal frame, it is possible to analyse how such processualism attains social 
form, and assess its efficacy, rather than taking process for granted as a 
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foundational feature of social life. In the case of the Apomixis Syndiate, this 
informed a critical perspective on how processualism was a key element of 
transitional, disciplinary practices engineered to produce biocapital. In the case 
of Villeneuve, it enabled the identification and analysis of a processual idiom as a 
temporal critique of contemporary hegemonies, and facilitated a temporally-
nuanced interpretation of local identity politics. Both exploratory cases, taken 
comparatively, reveal the cultural embeddedness of processual idioms and 
temporalities, and the anthropological implications of analysing this cultural 
figure and organisational practice in its socio-historical context. 
 
It would be an error to directly correlate how process operates in these contexts 
with social scientific usages, which themselves are embedded and contingent. It 
should also be noted that philosophies of immanence have Western European 
origins.23 Without doubt, an extended ethnographic study of links between 
metaphors of fluidity, change, process, and the social context of anthropological 
practice and writing would reveal much about processual practice among 
Western anthropologists. But it is clear from the theoretical literature cited 
above that discursive and organisational processualism enable temporal 
relations of continuity of action, and an at times unreflexive analytical frame that 
are central to contemporary anthropological discourse, and would benefit from 
such analysis. In sum, ‘processes’ permit what is at stake in the rhythmic tension 
of the moment to be mediated by a transcendent linkage of past and future. 
Processualism is a key conceptual tool and action framework for willing pasts and 
futures into procedural alignment, whether at the level of wider cultural 
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practice, or academic anthropological discourse. Let us conclude by critically 
assessing selected manifestations of timespace implicit in such practices, 
alongside conceptions afforded by an immanent perspective and tradition.24  
  
Under the processual regime, time thus becomes the spatial flow which we 
colonise, rather than this differential, conflictive field of force which we conjure 
through our practices. In this sense, ‘real time’ exists in the same way for all 
social actors, just as reality is said to exist and we project our representations 
onto it—a temporal incarnation of the scheme-content distinction (cf. Davidson 
1973, Henare et al. 2007:12–14). Used as a doxic analytical frame, likewise, 
process ‘cools’ the tensions of becoming. It obscures the virtual ‘fullness of time’ 
(Morson 1994) through its monological focus on constructing interconnections 
between successive actualisations ‘over time’. By contrast, the task of an 
anthropology of immanence is to render visible this act of mediation—while 
acknowledging that immanence itself, as ‘reality in the making’, must ultimately 
elude anthropological practices of conceptualisation and representation (cf. de 
Beistegui 2010:192). The actualization of an event is immanent in time—time is 
not the transcendent measurement of the event. ‘Past and future,’ Turetzky 
writes, ‘and consequently all time, arise in the moment. This moment is not in 
time as one moment among many in a container, it is time’ (Turetzky 1998:109). 
Time is likewise not a flowing or flux-like backdrop for anthropological analysis—
but an emergent property of events. It is a differential multiplicity, materialistic, 
multivectorial, complex, aleatory (Deleuze 2004, Hodges 2008). Such images 
enable us to think process from Arendt’s standpoint: as a contingent figure for 
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configuring ‘time’ that both enables and disables. And as a concept that must be 
displaced from a totalising discursive role, which often marks seminal social 
scientific usages of ‘process’ (e.g. Bourdieu 1977, Smith 1982, Wolf 1982), if we 
are to detect the temporalising practices and reterritorialisations integral to how 
‘processes’ are constructed. 
  
‘Processual practice’ therefore operates to disembedded and reincorporate 
intensities into pathways of actualisation. We can recall that, when integrated 
with disciplinary programmes, this is a key dimension of practices of 
instrumentalisation and rationalisation (Feenberg 2004), as suggested by the first 
of our cases, above. One overlap between this wider processualism and totalising 
invocations of process where they occur in social scientific discourses lies in how 
the social sciences themselves can constitute disciplinary activities (see Hodges 
2011). To be processed, to be disciplined, is to enter into procedure. All such 
disciplinary programmes arguably operate through making life available for re-
embedding in processual cultural practices—that is to say, practices intended to 
create an ordered course of action or complex linkage between pasts and 
futures. Many are grounded in corresponding images of fluid time. 
Processualism, conceived polythetically, is perhaps the dominant temporality of 
the disciplinary society, in its many forms.25 To create an interval in process, 
therefore, is an act of freedom in Arendt’s sense: the time of the interval. Such 
intervals exist as perpetual side-shadows that many procedures may be said to 




In this respect, it is important to displace these fluid idioms—to speak, at times, 
of the pulse of timespace, an immanent, differential pulsation which contracts 
and conflicts and in which everything is at stake;26 or employ shifting metaphors, 
as appropriate, that reflect the topological qualities of timespace (e.g. Serres & 
Latour 1997); or view the eternal renewal of metaphors as a method for 
combating the transcendental impulse and engaging with immanence itself (de 
Beistegui 2010, Deleuze & Guattari 1988). In this sense the quest for an 
anthropology of immanence compels an ‘immanent anthropology’. Concepts no 
longer constitute empty forms awaiting content, or different representations of 
the same social reality, but are actively produced in analytical and ethnographic 
practice. If this is similar to the position advanced in the ‘ontological turn’ in 
anthropology, what has been lacking, arguably, is temporal nuance (cf. Hodges 
2008). An immanent anthropology acknowledges the ‘radical constructivism’ 
endorsed by other anthropologists (e.g. Henare et al. 2007, Latour 2007, Viveiros 
de Castro 2002). Yet it engages with temporal immanence to reframe the radical 
construction of processes, for example, as socio-material temporalizing 
practices—concerned with the creation of epochal moments—rather than 
transcendent frames for analysis. Social life is no longer posited as existing within 
the ‘flow of time’, but as generated in an immanent field. Conjuring such 
modalities of time might, ultimately, enable more effective anthropological 
purchase on conflictive, multiplex ‘timespace in the making’. And inspire a 
complementary, radically constructivist anthropology of contingent temporal 





                                                          
1 See: http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY. 
html?subview=Main&entry=t27.e11947, accessed 01/05/2012. Compare: process (n.): 
early 14C., ‘fact of being carried on’ (e.g. ‘in process’), from O.Fr. proces ‘journey’ (13C.), 
from L. processus ‘process, advance, progress,’ from pp. stem of procedere ‘go forward’. 
Meaning ‘course or method of action’ is from mid-14C.; sense of ‘continuous series of 
actions meant to accomplish some result’ (the main modern sense) is from 1620s. 
(Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/process, accessed 
01/05/2012.) 
2 Lyman (2007:220–24) reviews anthropological usages of process prior to the 1980s, 
illustrating how the trope did not occupy the foundational place it does today. 
3 Fabian (1983:24) writes: ‘As soon as a culture is no longer primarily conceived as a set 
of rules to be enacted by individual members of distinct groups, but as the specific way 
in which actors create and produce beliefs, values, and other means of social life, it has 
to be recognised that Time is a constitutive dimension of social reality’.  
4 For Rescher (2000:22): ‘A process is an actual or possible occurrence that consists of an 
integrated series of connected developments … that are systematically linked to one 
another either causally or functionally … Processes develop over time: any particular … 
process combines existence in the present with tentacles that reach into the past and 
future’. He identifies three key characteristics: ‘1. A process is a complex of 
occurrences—a unity of distinct stages or phases … 2. This complex of occurrences has a 
certain temporal coherence and integrity, and processes accordingly have an 
ineliminably temporal dimension. 3. A process has a structure, a formal generic 





                                                                                                                                                               
5 See Bourdieu 2000:206–45 for clarification of these issues, towards the end of his 
career. 
6 Consider also ‘process philosophy’. Some process philosophers propose a transcendent 
concept of process comparable with contemporary social scientific discourse. Others 
such as Whitehead (1979) argue for a radical conceptualisation of ‘process’, closer to the 
immanent philosophy of Spinoza and Deleuze, asserting  that any occasion belonging to 
a ‘process’ is an incidence (‘concrescence’) of novelty or form of ‘birth’ with no 
transcendent frame. 
7 See Hodges 2008:408–17 for analysis of one possible foundation for the temporal 
ontology that underpins this approach. 
8 Agromonde is a French state-funded organisation focused on research and consultancy 
in the fields of agriculture, biodiversity and the environment, chiefly for the developing 
world. Pseudonyms are used for companies and individuals mentioned here, and some 
inconsequential details have been changed for legal and confidential reasons. 
9 ‘International Rice and Wheat Improvement Center’. 
10 Hodges 2012 provides a study of Marceau’s project and its transformation into the 
‘Apomixis Syndicate’.  
11 E.g. Triticum aestivum (common bread wheat). 
12 T-GURT allows seed saving, but any genetic enhancements require activation by a 
spray. V-Gurt controls GM plants by ensuring that second-generation seeds are not 
fertile. These are known as ‘terminator-technologies’ and are currently subject to a UN 
moratorium. 
13 ‘Sideshadowing relies on a concept of time as a field of possibilities. Each moment has 
a set of possible events (though by no means every conceivable event) that could take 




                                                                                                                                                               
thereby recreates the fullness of time as it was … we do not see contradictory actualities, 
but one possibility that was actualised and, at the same moment, another that could 
have been but was not’ (Morson 1994:118, 120–21). Sideshadows can be of ephemeral, 
or durable consequence. Their potential for actualisation can be tied to a contingent 
historical context or endure. Timespace can thus be grasped as emergent, differential, 
and dialogical, incorporating the actual and its virtual sideshadows (Hodges 2012:26–27, 
cf. Deleuze 2004). Giving processual ‘direction’ to cultural practice requires obviating 
selected sideshadows, and actualising others. 
14 I analyse this periodization in Hodges 2010, providing more detail than is possible 
here. 
15 This overview masks differentiation within these social groupings. 
16 Censuses of 1946 and 1999. 
17 For Gurvitch, enduring time is where ‘the past is projected in the present and in the 
future. This is the most continuous of the social times despite its retention of some 
proportion of the qualitative and the contingent penetrated with multiple meanings … 
Among the social classes it is the peasant class, and among the global societies the 
patriarchal structures which appear to actualize this time’ (Gurvitch 1964:31).  
18 Erratic time is that ‘enigmatic series of intervals and moments placed within duration. 
This is a time of uncertainty par excellence where contingency is accentuated, while the 
qualitative element and discontinuity become prominent eventually. The present 
appears to prevail over the past and the future, with which it sometimes finds it difficult 
to enter into relations … This is the time of global societies in transition, as our society of 
today so often is’ (Gurvitch 1964:32–33). 
19 Those cultural media used for the evocation and co-ordination of time and activities, 




                                                                                                                                                               
so on involved in ‘time reckoning’; but also other symbolic media such as language with 
its complex temporal markers or narrative genres (cf. Gell 1992:118–26). 
20 See note 13. 
21 An ‘immanent anthropology’ should be distinguished from influential forms of 
‘immanent critique’ associated with the Frankfurt School, although this is not to say that 
they are incompatible. Likewise, no theological association is intended.  
22 Deleuze writes: ‘we have no other continuities apart from those of our thousands of 
component habits’, yet ‘[h]abit draws something new from repetition—namely 
difference’ (2004:94–95).  
23 Immanence is also a feature of philosophical systems from other parts of the world, 
e.g. Zen Buddhism. 
24 An allowance should be made for the limited number of social scientific approaches 
grounded in Whitehead (1979) and comparable process philosophers. See note 6. 
25 Hardt and Negri (2000:23) gloss: ‘The disciplinary society is … constructed through a 
diffuse network of … apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and 
productive practices … [D]isciplinary institutions (the prison, the factory, the asylum, the 
hospital, the university, the school, and so forth) … structure the social terrain and 
present logics adequate to the “reason” of discipline. Disciplinary power rules in effect 
by structuring the parameters and limits of thought and practice’. 
26 Turetzky (1998:109) writes of Nietzsche’s philosophy of time: ‘Time is not a flow, but a 
pulsation. If time merely flowed it would lack tension and no differentiation would 
occur. The whole of time is at stake in the rhythmic tension of the moment’. 
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